Archive for the ‘Safety’ Category

A story was shared this week.

A story of hope for the hard-pressed NHS, its patients, its staff and its managers and its leaders.

A story that says “We can learn how to fix the NHS ourselves“.

And the story comes with evidence; hard, objective, scientific, statistically significant evidence.


The story starts almost exactly three years ago when a Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG) in England made a bold strategic decision to invest in improvement, or as they termed it “Achieving Clinical Excellence” (ACE).

They invited proposals from their local practices with the “carrot” of enough funding to allow GPs to carve-out protected time to do the work.  And a handful of proposals were selected and financially supported.

This is the story of one of those proposals which came from three practices in Sutton who chose to work together on a common problem – the unplanned hospital admissions in their over 70’s.

Their objective was clear and measurable: “To reduce the cost of unplanned admissions in the 70+ age group by working with hospital to reduce length of stay.

Did they achieve their objective?

Yes, they did.  But there is more to this story than that.  Much more.


One innovative step they took was to invest in learning how to diagnose why the current ‘system’ was costing what it was; then learning how to design an improvement; and then learning how to deliver that improvement.

They invested in developing their own improvement science skills first.

They did not assume they already knew how to do this and they engaged an experienced health care systems engineer (HCSE) to show them how to do it (i.e. not to do it for them).

Another innovative step was to create a blog to make it easier to share what they were learning with their colleagues; and to invite feedback and suggestions; and to provide a journal that captured the story as it unfolded.

And they measured stuff before they made any changes and afterwards so they could measure the impact, and so that they could assess the evidence scientifically.

And that was actually quite easy because the CCG was already measuring what they needed to know: admissions, length of stay, cost, and outcomes.

All they needed to learn was how to present and interpret that data in a meaningful way.  And as part of their IS training,  they learned how to use system behaviour charts, or SBCs.


By Jan 2015 they had learned enough of the HCSE techniques and tools to establish the diagnosis and start to making changes to the parts of the system that they could influence.


Two years later they subjected their before-and-after data to robust statistical analysis and they had a surprise. A big one!

Reducing hospital mortality was not a stated objective of their ACE project, and they only checked the mortality data to be sure that it had not changed.

But it had, and the “p=0.014” part of the statement above means that the probability that this 20.0% reduction in hospital mortality was due to random chance … is less than 1.4%.  [This is well below the 5% threshold that we usually accept as “statistically significant” in a clinical trial.]

But …

This was not a randomised controlled trial.  This was an intervention in a complicated, ever-changing system; so they needed to check that the hospital mortality for comparable patients who were not their patients had not changed as well.

And the statistical analysis of the hospital mortality for the ‘other’ practices for the same patient group, and the same period of time confirmed that there had been no statistically significant change in their hospital mortality.

So, it appears that what the Sutton ACE Team did to reduce length of stay (and cost) had also, unintentionally, reduced hospital mortality. A lot!


And this unexpected outcome raises a whole raft of questions …


If you would like to read their full story then you can do so … here.

It is a story of hunger for improvement, of humility to learn, of hard work and of hope for the future.

reading_a_book_pa_150_wht_3136An effective way to improve is to learn from others who have demonstrated the capability to achieve what we seek.  To learn from success.

Another effective way to improve is to learn from those who are not succeeding … to learn from failures … and that means … to learn from our own failings.

But from an early age we are socially programmed with a fear of failure.

The training starts at school where failure is not tolerated, nor is challenging the given dogma.  Paradoxically, the effect of our fear of failure is that our ability to inquire, experiment, learn, adapt, and to be resilient to change is severely impaired!

So further failure in the future becomes more likely, not less likely. Oops!


Fortunately, we can develop a healthier attitude to failure and we can learn how to harness the gap between intent and impact as a source of energy, creativity, innovation, experimentation, learning, improvement and growing success.

And health care provides us with ample opportunities to explore this unfamiliar terrain. The creative domain of the designer and engineer.


The scatter plot below is a snapshot of the A&E 4 hr target yield for all NHS Trusts in England for the month of July 2016.  The required “constitutional” performance requirement is better than 95%.  The delivered whole system average is 85%.  The majority of Trusts are failing, and the Trust-to-Trust variation is rather wide. Oops!

This stark picture of the gap between intent (95%) and impact (85%) prompts some uncomfortable questions:

Q1: How can one Trust achieve 98% and yet another can do no better than 64%?

Q2: What can all Trusts learn from these high and low flying outliers?

[NB. I have not asked the question “Who should we blame for the failures?” because the name-shame-blame-game is also a predictable consequence of our fear-of-failure mindset.]


Let us dig a bit deeper into the information mine, and as we do that we need to be aware of a trap:

A snapshot-in-time tells us very little about how the system and the set of interconnected parts is behaving-over-time.

We need to examine the time-series charts of the outliers, just as we would ask for the temperature, blood pressure and heart rate charts of our patients.

Here are the last six years by month A&E 4 hr charts for a sample of the high-fliers. They are all slightly different and we get the impression that the lower two are struggling more to stay aloft more than the upper two … especially in winter.


And here are the last six years by month A&E 4 hr charts for a sample of the low-fliers.  The Mark I Eyeball Test results are clear … these swans are falling out of the sky!


So we need to generate some testable hypotheses to explain these visible differences, and then we need to examine the available evidence to test them.

One hypothesis is “rising demand”.  It says that “the reason our A&E is failing is because demand on A&E is rising“.

Another hypothesis is “slow flow”.  It says that “the reason our A&E is failing is because of the slow flow through the hospital because of delayed transfers of care (DTOCs)“.

So, if these hypotheses account for the behaviour we are observing then we would predict that the “high fliers” are (a) diverting A&E arrivals elsewhere, and (b) reducing admissions to free up beds to hold the DTOCs.

Let us look at the freely available data for the highest flyer … the green dot on the scatter gram … code-named “RC9”.

The top chart is the A&E arrivals per month.

The middle chart is the A&E 4 hr target yield per month.

The bottom chart is the emergency admissions per month.

Both arrivals and admissions are increasing, while the A&E 4 hr target yield is rock steady!

And arranging the charts this way allows us to see the temporal patterns more easily (and the images are deliberately arranged to show the overall pattern-over-time).

Patterns like the change-for-the-better that appears in the middle of the winter of 2013 (i.e. when many other trusts were complaining that their sagging A&E performance was caused by “winter pressures”).

The objective evidence seems to disprove the “rising demand”, “slow flow” and “winter pressure” hypotheses!

So what can we learn from our failure to adequately explain the reality we are seeing?


The trust code-named “RC9” is Luton and Dunstable, and it is an average district general hospital, on the surface.  So to reveal some clues about what actually happened there, we need to read their Annual Report for 2013-14.  It is a public document and it can be downloaded here.

This is just a snippet …

… and there are lots more knowledge nuggets like this in there …

… it is a treasure trove of well-known examples of good system flow design.

The results speak for themselves!


Q: How many black swans does it take to disprove the hypothesis that “all swans are white”.

A: Just one.

“RC9” is a black swan. An outlier. A positive deviant. “RC9” has disproved the “impossibility” hypothesis.

And there is another flock of black swans living in the North East … in the Newcastle area … so the “Big cities are different” hypothesis does not hold water either.


The challenge here is a human one.  A human factor.  Our learned fear of failure.

Learning-how-to-fail is the way to avoid failing-how-to-learn.

And to read more about that radical idea I strongly recommend reading the recently published book called Black Box Thinking by Matthew Syed.

It starts with a powerful story about the impact of human factors in health care … and here is a short video of Martin Bromiley describing what happened.

The “black box” that both Martin and Matthew refer to is the one that is used in air accident investigations to learn from what happened, and to use that learning to design safer aviation systems.

Martin Bromiley has founded a charity to support the promotion of human factors in clinical training, the Clinical Human Factors Group.

So if we can muster the courage and humility to learn how to do this in health care for patient safety, then we can also learn to how do it for flow, quality and productivity.

Our black swan called “RC9” has demonstrated that this goal is attainable.

And the body of knowledge needed to do this already exists … it is called Health and Social Care Systems Engineering (HSCSE).


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Postscript: And I am pleased to share that Luton & Dunstable features in the House of Commons Health Committee report entitled Winter Pressures in A&E Departments that was published on 3rd Nov 2016.

Here is part of what L&D shared to explain their deviant performance:

luton_nuggets

These points describe rather well the essential elements of a pull design, which is the antidote to the rather more prevalent pressure cooker design.

On 5th July 2018, the NHS will be 70 years old, and like many of those it was created to serve, it has become elderly and frail.

We live much longer, on average, than we used to and the growing population of frail elderly are presenting an unprecedented health and social care challenge that the NHS was never designed to manage.

The creases and cracks are showing, and each year feels more pressured than the last.


This week a story that illustrates this challenge was shared with me along with permission to broadcast …

“My mother-in-law is 91, in general she is amazingly self-sufficient, able to arrange most of her life with reasonable care at home via a council tendered care provider.

She has had Parkinson’s for years, needing regular medication to enable her to walk and eat (it affects her jaw and swallowing capability). So the care provision is time critical, to get up, have lunch, have tea and get to bed.

She’s also going deaf, profoundly in one ear, pretty bad in the other. She wears a single ‘in-ear’ aid, which has a micro-switch on/off toggle, far too small for her to see or operate. Most of the carers can’t put it in, and fail to switch it off.

Her care package is well drafted, but rarely adhered to. It should be 45 minutes in the morning, 30, 15, 30 through the day. Each time administering the medications from the dossette box. Despite the register in/out process from the carers, many visits are far less time than designed (and paid for by the council), with some lasting 8 minutes instead of 30!

Most carers don’t ensure she takes her meds, which sometimes leads to dropped pills on the floor, with no hope of picking them up!

While the care is supposedly ‘time critical’ the provider don’t manage it via allocated time slots, they simply provide lists, that imply the order of work, but don’t make it clear. My mother-in-law (Mum) cannot be certain when the visit will occur, which makes going out very difficult.

The carers won’t cook food, but will micro-wave it, thus if a cooked meal is to happen, my Mum will start it, with the view of the carers serving it. If they arrive early, the food is under-cooked (“Just put vinegar on it, it will taste better”) and if they arrive late, either she’ll try to get it out herself, or it will be dried out / cremated.

Her medication pattern should be every 4 to 5 hours in the day, with a 11:40 lunch visit, and a 17:45 tea visit, followed by a 19:30 bed prep visit, she finishes up with too long between meds, followed by far too close together. Her GP has stated that this is making her health and Parkinson’s worse.

Mum also rarely drinks enough through the day, in the hot whether she tends to dehydrate, which we try to persuade her must be avoided. Part of the problem is Parkinson’s related, part the hassle of getting to the toilet more often. Parkinson’s affects swallowing, so she tends to sip, rather than gulp. By sipping often, she deludes herself that she is drinking enough.

She also is stubbornly not adjusting methods to align to issues. She drinks tea and water from her lovely bone china cups. Because her grip is not good and her hand shakes, we can’t fill those cups very high, so her ‘cup of tea’ is only a fraction of what it could be.

As she can walk around most days, there’s no way of telling whether she drinks enough, and she frequently has several different carers in a day.

When Mum gets dehydrated, it affects her memory and her reasoning, similar to the onset of dementia. It also seems to increase her probability of falling, perhaps due to forgetting to be defensive.

When she falls, she cannot get up, thus usually presses her alarm dongle, resulting in me going round to get her up, check for concussion, and check for other injuries, prior to settling her down again. These can be ten weeks apart, through to a few in a week.

When she starts to hallucinate, we do our very best to increase drinking, seeking to re-hydrate.

On Sunday, something exceptional happened, Mum fell out of bed and didn’t press her alarm. The carer found her and immediately called the paramedics and her GP, who later called us in. For the first time ever she was not sufficiently mentally alert to press her alarm switch.

After initial assessment, she was taken to A&E, luckily being early on Sunday morning it was initially quite quiet.

Hospital

The Hospital is on the boundary between two counties, within a large town, a mixture of new build elements, between aging structures. There has been considerable investment within A&E, X-ray etc. due partly to that growth industry and partly due to the closures of cottage hospitals and reducing GP services out of hours.

It took some persuasion to have Mum put on a drip, as she hadn’t had breakfast or any fluids, and dehydration was a probable primary cause of her visit. They took bloods, an X-ray of her chest (to check for fall related damage) and a CT scan of her head, to see if there were issues.

I called the carers to tell them to suspend visits, but the phone simply rang without be answered (not for the first time.)

After about six hours, during which time she was awake, but not very lucid, she was transferred to the day ward, where after assessment she was given some meds, a sandwich and another drip.

Later that evening we were informed she was to be kept on a drip for 24 hours.

The next day (Bank Holiday Monday) she was transferred to another ward. When we arrived she was not on a drip, so their decisions had been reversed.

I spoke at length with her assigned staff nurse, and was told the following: Mum could come out soon if she had a 24/7 care package, and that as well as the known issues mum now has COPD. When I asked her what COPD was, she clearly didn’t know, but flustered a ‘it is a form of heart failure that affects breathing’. (I looked it up on my phone a few minutes later.)

So, to get mum out, I had to arrange a 24/7 care package, and nowhere was open until the next day.

Trying to escalate care isn’t going to be easy, even in the short term. My emails to ‘usually very good’ social care people achieved nothing to start with on Tuesday, and their phone was on the ‘out of hours’ setting for evenings and weekends, despite being during the day of a normal working week.

Eventually I was told that there would be nothing to achieve until the hospital processed the correct exit papers to Social Care.

When we went in to the hospital (on Tuesday) a more senior nurse was on duty. She explained that mum was now medically fit to leave hospital if care can be re-established. I told her that I was trying to set up 24/7 care as advised. She looked through the notes and said 24/7 care was not needed, the normal 4 x a day was enough. (She was clearly angry).

I then explained that the newly diagnosed COPD may be part of the problem, she said that she’s worked with COPD patients for 16 years, and mum definitely doesn’t have COPD. While she was amending the notes, I noticed that mum’s allergy to aspirin wasn’t there, despite us advising that on entry. The nurse also explained that as the hospital is in one county, but almost half their patients are from another, they are always stymied on ‘joined up working’

While we were talking with mum, her meds came round and she was only given paracetamol for her pain, but NOT her meds for Parkinson’s. I asked that nurse why that was the case, and she said that was not on her meds sheet. So I went back to the more senior nurse, she checked the meds as ordered and Parkinson’s was required 4 x a day, but it was NOT transferred onto the administration sheet. The doctor next to us said she would do it straight away, and I was told, “Thank God you are here to get this right!”

Mum was given her food, it consisted of some soup, which she couldn’t spoon due to lack of meds and a dry tough lump of gammon and some mashed sweet potato, which she couldn’t chew.

When I asked why meds were given at five, after the delivery of food, they said ‘That’s our system!’, when I suggested that administering Parkinson’s meds an hour before food would increase the ability to eat the food they said “that’s a really good idea, we should do that!”

On Wednesday I spoke with Social Care to try to re-start care to enable mum to get out. At that time the social worker could neither get through to the hospital nor the carers. We spoke again after I had arrived in hospital, but before I could do anything.

On arrival at the hospital I was amazed to see the white-board declaring that mum would be discharged for noon on Monday (in five days-time!). I spoke with the assigned staff nurse who said, “That’s the earliest that her carers can re-start, and anyway its nearly the weekend”.

I said that “mum was medically OK for discharge on Tuesday, after only two days in the hospital, and you are complacent to block the bed for another six days, have you spoken with the discharge team?”

She replied, “No they’ll have gone home by now, and I’ve not seen them all day” I told her that they work shifts, and that they will be here, and made it quite clear if she didn’t contact SHEDs that I’d go walkabout to find them. A few minutes later she told me a SHED member would be with me in 20 minutes.

While the hospital had resolved her medical issues, she was stuck in a ward, with no help to walk, the only TV via a complex pay-for system she had no hope of understanding, with no day room, so no entertainment, no exercise, just boredom encouraged to lay in bed, wear a pad because she won’t be taken to the loo in time.

When the SHED worker arrived I explained the staff nurse attitude, she said she would try to improve those thinking processes. She took lots of details, then said that so long as mum can walk with assistance, she could be released after noon, to have NHS carer support, 4 times a day, from the afternoon. She walked around the ward for the first time since being admitted, and while shaky was fine.

Hopefully all will be better now?”


This story is not exceptional … I have heard it many times from many people in many different parts of the UK.  It is the norm rather than the exception.

It is the story of a fragmented and fractured system of health and social care.

It is the story of frustration for everyone – patients, family, carers, NHS staff, commissioners, and tax-payers.  A fractured care system is unsafe, chaotic, frustrating and expensive.

There are no winners here.  It is not a trade off, compromise or best possible.

It is just poor system design.


What we want has a name … it is called a Frail Safe design … and this is not a new idea.  It is achievable. It has been achieved.

http://www.frailsafe.org.uk

So why is this still happening?

The reason is simple – the NHS does not know any other way.  It does not know how to design itself to be safe, calm, efficient, high quality and affordable.

It does not know how to do this because it has never learned that this is possible.

But it is possible to do, and it is possible to learn, and that learning does not take very long or cost very much.

And the return vastly outnumbers the investment.


The title of this blog is Righteous Indignation

… if your frail elderly parents, relatives or friends were forced to endure a system that is far from frail safe; and you learned that this situation was avoidable and that a safer design would be less expensive; and all you hear is “can’t do” and “too busy” and “not enough money” and “not my job” …  wouldn’t you feel a sense of righteous indignation?

I do.


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BloodSuckerThis is a magnified picture of a blood sucking bug called a Red Poultry Mite.

They go red after having gorged themselves on chicken blood.

Their life-cycle is only 7 days so, when conditions are just right, they can quickly cause an infestation – and one that is remarkably difficult to eradicate!  But if it is not dealt with then chicken coop productivity will plummet.


We use the term “bug” for something else … a design error … in a computer program for example.  If the conditions are just right, then software bugs can spread too and can infest a computer system.  They feed on the hardware resources – slurping up processor time and memory space until the whole system slows to a crawl.


And one especially pernicious type of system design error is called an Error of Omission.  These are the things we do not do that would prevent the bloodsucking bugs from breeding and spreading.

Prevention is better than cure.


In the world of health care improvement there are some blood suckers out there, ones who home in on a susceptible host looking for a safe place to establish a colony.  They are masters of the art of mimicry.  They look like and sound like something they are not … they claim to be symbiotic whereas in reality they are parasitic.

The clue to their true nature is that their impact does not match their intent … but by the time that gap is apparent they are entrenched and their spores have already spread.

Unlike the Red Poultry Mites, we do not want to eradicate them … we need to educate them. They only behave like parasites because they are missing a few essential bits of software.  And once those upgrades are installed they can achieve their potential and become symbiotic.

So, let me introduce them, they are called Len, Siggy and Tock and here is their story:

Six Ways Not To Improve Flow

CrashTestDummyThere are two complementary approaches to safety and quality improvement: desire and design.

In the improvement-by-desire world we use a suck-it-and-see approach to fix a problem.  It is called PDSA.

Sometimes this works and we pat ourselves on the back, and remember the learning for future use.

Sometimes it works for us but has a side effect: it creates a problem for someone else.  And we may not be aware of the unintended consequence unless someone shouts “Oi!” It may be too late by then of course.


The more parts in a system, and the more interconnected they are, the more likely it is that a well-intended suck-it-and-see change will create an unintended negative impact.

And in that situation our temptation is to … do nothing … and put up with the problems. It seems the safest option.


In the improvement-by-design world we choose to study first, and to find the causal roots of the system behaviour we are seeing.  Our first objective is a diagnosis.

With that we can propose rational design changes that we anticipate will deliver the improvement we seek without creating adverse effects.

But we have learned the hard way that our intuition can trick us … so we need a way to test our designs … a safe and controlled way.  We need a crash test dummy!


What they do is to deliberately experience our design in a controlled experiment, and what they generate for us is constructive feedback. What did work, and what did not.

A crash test dummy is tough and sensitive at the same time.  They do not break easily and yet they feel the pain and gain too.  They are resilient.


And with their feedback we can re-visit our design and improve it further, or we can use it to offer evidence-based assurance that our design is fit-for-purpose.

Safety and Quality Assurance is improvement-by-design. Diagnosis-and-treatment.

Safety and Quality Control is improvement-by-desire. Suck-and-see.

If you were a passenger or a patient … which option would you prefer?

figure_falling_with_arrow_17621The late Russell Ackoff used to tell a great story. It goes like this:

“A team set themselves the stretch goal of building the World’s Best Car.  So the put their heads together and came up with a plan.

First they talked to drivers and drew up a list of all the things that the World’s Best Car would need to have. Safety, speed, low fuel consumption, comfort, good looks, low emissions and so on.

Then they drew up a list of all the components that go into building a car. The engine, the wheels, the bodywork, the seats, and so on.

Then they set out on a quest … to search the world for the best components … and to bring the best one of each back.

Then they could build the World’s Best Car.

Or could they?

No.  All they built was a pile of incompatible parts. The WBC did not work. It was a futile exercise.


Then the penny dropped. The features in their wish-list were not associated with any of the separate parts. Their desired performance emerged from the way the parts worked together. The working relationships between the parts were as necessary as the parts themselves.

And a pile of average parts that work together will deliver a better performance than a pile of best parts that do not.

So the relationships were more important than the parts!


From this they learned that the quickest, easiest and cheapest way to degrade performance is to make working-well-together a bit more difficult.  Irrespective of the quality of the parts.


Q: So how do we reverse this degradation of performance?

A: Add more failure-avoidance targets of course!

But we just discovered that the performance is the effect of how the parts work well together?  Will another failure-metric-fueled performance target help? How will each part know what it needs to do differently – if anything?  How will each part know if the changes they have made are having the intended impact?

Fragmentation has a cost.  Fear, frustration, futility and ultimately financial failure.

So if performance is fading … the quality of the working relationships is a good place to look for opportunities for improvement.

stick_figure_help_button_150_wht_9911Imagine this scenario:

You develop some non-specific symptoms.

You see your GP who refers you urgently to a 2 week clinic.

You are seen, assessed, investigated and informed that … you have cancer!


The shock, denial, anger, blame, bargaining, depression, acceptance sequence kicks off … it is sometimes called the Kübler-Ross grief reaction … and it is a normal part of the human psyche.

But there is better news. You also learn that your condition is probably treatable, but that it will require chemotherapy, and that there are no guarantees of success.

You know that time is of the essence … the cancer is growing.

And time has a new relevance for you … it is called life time … and you know that you may not have as much left as you had hoped.  Every hour is precious.


So now imagine your reaction when you attend your local chemotherapy day unit (CDU) for your first dose of chemotherapy and have to wait four hours for the toxic but potentially life-saving drugs.

They are very expensive and they have a short shelf-life so the NHS cannot afford to waste any.   The Aseptic Unit team wait until all the safety checks are OK before they proceed to prepare your chemotherapy.  That all takes time, about four hours.

Once the team get to know you it will go quicker. Hopefully.

It doesn’t.

The delays are not the result of unfamiliarity … they are the result of the design of the process.

All your fellow patients seem to suffer repeated waiting too, and you learn that they have been doing so for a long time.  That seems to be the way it is.  The waiting room is well used.

Everyone seems resigned to the belief that this is the best it can be.

They are not happy about it but they feel powerless to do anything.


Then one day someone demonstrates that it is not the best it can be.

It can be better.  A lot better!

And they demonstrate that this better way can be designed.

And they demonstrate that they can learn how to design this better way.

And they demonstrate what happens when they apply their new learning …

… by doing it and by sharing their story of “what-we-did-and-how-we-did-it“.

CDU_Waiting_Room

If life time is so precious, why waste it?

And perhaps the most surprising outcome was that their safer, quicker, calmer design was also 20% more productive.

CapstanA capstan is a simple machine for combining the effort of many people and enabling them to achieve more than any of them could do alone.

The word appears to have come into English from the Portuguese and Spanish sailors at around the time of the Crusades.

Each sailor works independently of the others. There is no requirement them to be equally strong because the capstan will combine their efforts.  And the capstan also serves as a feedback loop because everyone can sense when someone else pushes harder or slackens off.  It is an example of simple, efficient, effective, elegant design.


In the world of improvement we also need simple, efficient, effective and elegant ways to combine the efforts of many in achieving a common purpose.  Such as raising the standards of excellence and weighing the anchors of resistance.

In health care improvement we have many simultaneous constraints and we have many stakeholders with specific perspectives and special expertise.

And if we are not careful they will tend to pull only in their preferred direction … like a multi-way tug-o-war.  The result?  No progress and exhausted protagonists.

There are those focused on improving productivity – Team Finance.

There are those focused on improving delivery – Team Operations.

There are those focused on improving safety – Team Governance.

And we are all tasked with improving quality – Team Everyone.

So we need a synergy machine that works like a capstan-of-old, and here is one design.

Engine_Of_ExcellenceIt has four poles and it always turns in a clockwise direction, so the direction of push is clear.

And when all the protagonists push in the same direction, they will get their own ‘win’ and also assist the others to make progress.

This is how the sails of success are hoisted to catch the wind of change; and how the anchors of anxiety are heaved free of the rocks of fear; and how the bureaucratic bilge is pumped overboard to lighten our load and improve our speed and agility.

And the more hands on the capstan the quicker we will achieve our common goal.

Collective excellence.

KingsFund_Quality_Report_May_2016This week the King’s Fund published their Quality Monitoring Report for the NHS, and it makes depressing reading.

These highlights are a snapshot.

The website has some excellent interactive time-series charts that transform the deluge of data the NHS pumps out into pictures that tell a shameful story.

On almost all reported dimensions, things are getting worse and getting worse faster.

Which I do not believe is the intention.

But it is clearly the impact of the last 20 years of health and social care policy.


What is more worrying is the data that is notably absent from the King’s Fund QMR.

The first omission is outcome: How well did the NHS deliver on its intended purpose?  It is stated at the top of the NHS England web site …

NHSE_Purpose

And lets us be very clear here: dying, waiting, complaining, and over-spending are not measures of what we want: health and quality success metrics.  They are a measures of what we do not want; they are failure metrics.

The fanatical focus on failure is part of the hyper-competitive, risk-averse medical mindset:

primum non nocere (first do no harm),

and as a patient I am reassured to hear that but is no harm all I can expect?

What about:

tunc mederi (then do some healing)


And where is the data on dying in the Kings Fund QMR?

It seems to be notably absent.

And I would say that is a quality issue because it is something that patients are anxious about.  And that may be because they are given so much ‘open information’ about what might go wrong, not what should go right.


And you might think that sharp, objective data on dying would be easy to collect and to share.  After all, it is not conveniently fuzzy and subjective like satisfaction.

It is indeed mandatory to collect hospital mortality data, but sharing it seems to be a bit more of a problem.

The fear-of-failure fanaticism extends there too.  In the wake of humiliating, historical, catastrophic failures like Mid Staffs, all hospitals are monitored, measured and compared. And the negative deviants are named, shamed and blamed … in the hope that improvement might follow.

And to do the bench-marking we need to compare apples with apples; not peaches with lemons.  So we need to process the raw data to make it fair to compare; to ensure that factors known to be associated with higher risk of death are taken into account. Factors like age, urgency, co-morbidity and primary diagnosis.  Factors that are outside the circle-of-control of the hospitals themselves.

And there is an army of academics, statisticians, data processors, and analysts out there to help. The fruit of their hard work and dedication is called SHMI … the Summary Hospital Mortality Index.

SHMI_Specification

Now, the most interesting paragraph is the third one which outlines what raw data is fed in to building the risk-adjusted model.  The first four are objective, the last two are more subjective, especially the diagnosis grouping one.

The importance of this distinction comes down to human nature: if a hospital is failing on its SHMI then it has two options:
(a) to improve its policies and processes to improve outcomes, or
(b) to manipulate the diagnosis group data to reduce the SHMI score.

And the latter is much easier to do, it is called up-coding, and basically it involves camping at the pessimistic end of the diagnostic spectrum. And we are very comfortable with doing that in health care. We favour the Black Hat.

And when our patients do better than our pessimistically-biased prediction, then our SHMI score improves and we look better on the NHS funnel plot.

We do not have to do anything at all about actually improving the outcomes of the service we provide, which is handy because we cannot do that. We do not measure it!


And what might be notably absent from the data fed in to the SHMI risk-model?  Data that is objective and easy to measure.  Data such as length of stay (LOS) for example?

Is there a statistical reason that LOS is omitted? Not really. Any relevant metric is a contender for pumping into a risk-adjustment model.  And we all know that the sicker we are, the longer we stay in hospital, and the less likely we are to come out unharmed (or at all).  And avoidable errors create delays and complications that imply more risk, more work and longer length of stay. Irrespective of the illness we arrived with.

So why has LOS been omitted from SHMI?

The reason may be more political than statistical.

We know that the risk of death increases with infirmity and age.

We know that if we put frail elderly patients into a hospital bed for a few days then they will decondition and become more frail, require more time in hospital, are more likely to need a transfer of care to somewhere other than home, are more susceptible to harm, and more likely to die.

So why is LOS not in the risk-of-death SHMI model?

And it is not in the King’s Fund QR report either.

Nor is the amount of cash being pumped in to keep the HMS NHS afloat each month.

All notably absent!

Chimp_NoHear_NoSee_NoSpeakLast week I shared a link to Dr Don Berwick’s thought provoking presentation at the Healthcare Safety Congress in Sweden.

Near the end of the talk Don recommended six books, and I was reassured that I already had read three of them. Naturally, I was curious to read the other three.

One of the unfamiliar books was “Overcoming Organizational Defenses” by the late Chris Argyris, a professor at Harvard.  I confess that I have tried to read some of his books before, but found them rather difficult to understand.  So I was intrigued that Don was recommending it as an ‘easy read’.  Maybe I am more of a dimwit that I previously believed!  So fear of failure took over my inner-chimp and I prevaricated. I flipped into denial. Who would willingly want to discover the true depth of their dimwittedness!


Later in the week, I was forwarded a copy of a recently published paper that was on a topic closely related to a key thread in Dr Don’s presentation:

understanding variation.

The paper was by researchers who had looked at the Board reports of 30 randomly selected NHS Trusts to examine how information on safety and quality was being shared and used.  They were looking for evidence that the Trust Boards understood the importance of variation and the need to separate ‘signal’ from ‘noise’ before making decisions on actions to improve safety and quality performance.  This was a point Don had stressed too, so there was a link.

The randomly selected Trust Board reports contained 1488 charts, of which only 88 demonstrated the contribution of chance effects (i.e. noise). Of these, 72 showed the Shewhart-style control charts that Don demonstrated. And of these, only 8 stated how the control limits were constructed (which is an essential requirement for the chart to be meaningful and useful).

That is a validity yield of 8 out of 1488, or 0.54%, which is for all practical purposes zero. Oh dear!


This chance combination of apparently independent events got me thinking.

Q1: What is the reason that NHS Trust Boards do not use these signal-and-noise separation techniques when it has been demonstrated, for at least 12 years to my knowledge, that they are very effective for facilitating improvement in healthcare? (e.g. Improving Healthcare with Control Charts by Raymond G. Carey was published in 2003).

Q2: Is there some form of “organizational defense” system in place that prevents NHS Trust Boards from learning useful ‘new’ knowledge?


So I surfed the Web to learn more about Chris Argyris and to explore in greater depth his concept of Single Loop and Double Loop learning.  I was feeling like a dimwit again because to me it is not a very descriptive title!  I suspect it is not to many others too.

I sensed that I needed to translate the concept into the language of healthcare and this is what emerged.

Single Loop learning is like treating the symptoms and ignoring the disease.

Double Loop learning is diagnosing the underlying disease and treating that.


So what are the symptoms?
The pain of NHS Trust  failure on all dimensions – safety, delivery, quality and productivity (i.e. affordability for a not-for-profit enterprise).

And what are the signs?
The tell-tale sign is more subtle. It’s what is not present that is important. A serious omission. The missing bits are valid time-series charts in the Trust Board reports that show clearly what is signal and what is noise. This diagnosis is critical because the strategies for addressing them are quite different – as Julian Simcox eloquently describes in his latest essay.  If we get this wrong and we act on our unwise decision, then we stand a very high chance of making the problem worse, and demoralizing ourselves and our whole workforce in the process! Does that sound familiar?

And what is the disease?
Undiscussables.  Emotive subjects that are too taboo to table in the Board Room.  And the issue of what is discussable is one of the undiscussables so we have a self-sustaining system.  Anyone who attempts to discuss an undiscussable is breaking an unspoken social code.  Another undiscussable is behaviour, and our social code is that we must not upset anyone so we cannot discuss ‘difficult’ issues.  But by avoiding the issue (the undiscussable disease) we fail to address the root cause and end up upsetting everyone.  We achieve exactly what we are striving to avoid, which is the technical definition of incompetence.  And Chris Argyris labelled this as ‘skilled incompetence’.


Does an apparent lack of awareness of what is already possible fully explain why NHS Trust Boards do not use the tried-and-tested tool called a system behaviour chart to help them diagnose, design and deliver effective improvements in safety, flow, quality and productivity?

Or are there other forces at play as well?

Some deeper undiscussables perhaps?

The Harvard Business Review is worth reading because many of its articles challenge deeply held assumptions, and then back up the challenge with the pragmatic experience of those who have succeeded to overcome the limiting beliefs.

So the heading on the April 2016 copy that awaited me on my return from an Easter break caught my eye: YOU CAN’T FIX CULTURE.


 

HBR_April_2016

The successful leaders of major corporate transformations are agreed … the cultural change follows the technical change … and then the emergent culture sustains the improvement.

The examples presented include the Ford Motor Company, Delta Airlines, Novartis – so these are not corporate small fry!

The evidence suggests that the belief of “we cannot improve until the culture changes” is the mantra of failure of both leadership and management.


A health care system is characterised by a culture of risk avoidance. And for good reason. It is all too easy to harm while trying to heal!  Primum non nocere is a core tenet – first do no harm.

But, change and improvement implies taking risks – and those leaders of successful transformation know that the bigger risk by far is to become paralysed by fear and to do nothing.  Continual learning from many small successes and many small failures is preferable to crisis learning after a catastrophic failure!

The UK healthcare system is in a state of chronic chaos.  The evidence is there for anyone willing to look.  And waiting for the NHS culture to change, or pushing for culture change first appears to be a guaranteed recipe for further failure.

The HBR article suggests that it is better to stay focussed; to work within our circles of control and influence; to learn from others where knowledge is known, and where it is not – to use small, controlled experiments to explore new ground.


And I know this works because I have done it and I have seen it work.  Just by focussing on what is important to every member on the team; focussing on fixing what we could fix; not expecting or waiting for outside help; gathering and sharing the feedback from patients on a continuous basis; and maintaining patient and team safety while learning and experimenting … we have created a micro-culture of high safety, high efficiency, high trust and high productivity.  And we have shared the evidence via JOIS.

The micro-culture required to maintain the safety, flow, quality and productivity improvements emerged and evolved along with the improvements.

It was part of the effect, not the cause.


So the concept of ‘fix the system design flaws and the continual improvement culture will emerge’ seems to work at macro-system and at micro-system levels.

We just need to learn how to diagnose and treat healthcare system design flaws. And that is known knowledge.

So what is the next excuse?  Too busy?

frailsafeSafe means avoiding harm, and safety is an emergent property of a well-designed system.

Frail means infirm, poorly, wobbly and at higher risk of harm.

So we want our health care system to be a FrailSafe Design.

But is it? How would we know? And what could we do to improve it?


About ten years ago I was involved in a project to improve the safety design of a specific clinical stream flowing through the hospital that I work in.

The ‘at risk’ group of patients were frail elderly patients admitted as an emergency after a fall and who had suffered a fractured thigh bone. The neck of the femur.

Historically, the outcome for these patients was poor.  Many do not survive, and many of the survivors never returned to independent living. They become even more frail.


The project was undertaken during an organisational transition, the hospital was being ‘taken over’ by a bigger one.  This created a window of opportunity for some disruptive innovation, and the project was labelled as a ‘Lean’ one because we had been inspired by similar work done at Bolton some years before and Lean was the flavour of the month.

The actual change was small: it was a flow design tweak that cost nothing to implement.

First we asked two flow questions:
Q1: How many of these high-risk frail patients do we admit a year?
A1: About one per day on average.
Q2: What is the safety critical time for these patients?
A2: The first four days.  The sooner they have hip surgery and are able to be actively mobilise the better their outcome.

Second we applied Little’s Law which showed the average number of patients in this critical phase is four. This was the ‘work in progress’ or WIP.

And we knew that variation is always present, and we knew that having all these patients in one place would make it much easier for the multi-disciplinary teams to provide timely care and to avoid potentially harmful delays.

So we suggested that one six-bedded bay on one of the trauma wards be designated the Fractured Neck Of Femur bay.

That was the flow diagnosis and design done.

The safety design was created by the multi-disciplinary teams who looked after these patients: the geriatricians, the anaesthetists, the perioperative emergency care team (PECT), the trauma and orthopaedic team, the physiotherapists, and so on.

They designed checklists to ensure that all #NOF patients got what they needed when they needed it and so that nothing important was left to chance.

And that was basically it.

And the impact was remarkable. The stream flowed. And one measured outcome was a dramatic and highly statistically significant reduction in mortality.

Injury_2011_Results
The full paper was published in Injury 2011; 42: 1234-1237.

We had created a FrailSafe Design … which implied that what was happening before was clearly not safe for these frail patients!


And there was an improved outcome for the patients who survived: A far larger proportion rehabilitated and returned to independent living, and a far smaller proportion required long-term institutional care.

By learning how to create and implement a FrailSafe Design we had added both years-to-life and life-to-years.

It cost nothing to achieve and the message was clear, as this quote is from the 2011 paper illustrates …

Injury_2011_Message

What was a bit disappointing was the gap of four years between delivering this dramatic and highly significant patient safety and quality improvement and the sharing of the story.


What is more exciting is that the concept of FrailSafe is growing, evolving and spreading.

Pearl_and_OysterThe word pearl is a metaphor for something rare, beautiful, and valuable.

Pearls are formed inside the shell of certain mollusks as a defense mechanism against a potentially threatening irritant.

The mollusk creates a pearl sac to seal off the irritation.


And so it is with change and improvement.  The growth of precious pearls of improvement wisdom – the ones that develop slowly over time – are triggered by an irritant.

Someone asking an uncomfortable question perhaps, or presenting some information that implies that an uncomfortable question needs to be asked.


About seven years ago a question was asked “Would improving healthcare flow and quality result in lower costs?”

It is a good question because some believe that it would and some believe that it would not.  So an experiment to test the hypothesis was needed.

The Health Foundation stepped up to the challenge and funded a three year project to find the answer. The design of the experiment was simple. Take two oysters and introduce an irritant into them and see if pearls of wisdom appeared.

The two ‘oysters’ were Sheffield Hospital and Warwick Hospital and the irritant was Dr Kate Silvester who is a doctor and manufacturing system engineer and who has a bit-of-a-reputation for asking uncomfortable questions and backing them up with irrefutable information.


Two rare and precious pearls did indeed grow.

In Sheffield, it was proved that by improving the design of their elderly care process they improved the outcome for their frail, elderly patients.  More went back to their own homes and fewer left via the mortuary.  That was the quality and safety improvement. They also showed a shorter length of stay and a reduction in the number of beds needed to store the work in progress.  That was the flow and productivity improvement.

What was interesting to observe was how difficult it was to get these profoundly important findings published.  It appeared that a further irritant had been created for the academic peer review oyster!

The case study was eventually published in Age and Aging 2014; 43: 472-77.

The pearl that grew around this seed is the Sheffield Microsystems Academy.


In Warwick, it was proved that the A&E 4 hour performance could be improved by focussing on improving the design of the processes within the hospital, downstream of A&E.  For example, a redesign of the phlebotomy and laboratory process to ensure that clinical decisions on a ward round are based on todays blood results.

This specific case study was eventually published as well, but by a different path – one specifically designed for sharing improvement case studies – JOIS 2015; 22:1-30

And the pearls of wisdom that developed as a result of irritating many oysters in the Warwick bed are clearly described by Glen Burley, CEO of Warwick Hospital NHS Trust in this recent video.


Getting the results of all these oyster bed experiments published required irritating the Health Foundation oyster … but a pearl grew there too and emerged as the full Health Foundation report which can be downloaded here.


So if you want to grow a fistful of improvement and a bagful of pearls of wisdom … then you will need to introduce a bit of irritation … and Dr Kate Silvester is a proven source of grit for your oyster!

Learning how to manage is as vital as learning how to lead.

by Julian Simcox

Recently I blogged to introduce the re-publication of my 10 year old essay:

“Intervening into Personal and Organisational Systems by Powerfully Leading and Wisely Managing”

The key ideas in that essay were seven fold:

  1. Aiming to develop Leadership separately from Management is likely to confuse anyone targeted by a separatist training programme, the reality being that everyone in organisational life is necessarily and simultaneously both Managing and Leading (M/L) and often desperately trying to integrate them as two very different action-logics.
  2. Managing and Leading are not roles but ways of thinking and acting that need to be intently chosen, according to the particular learning context (one of three) that any Managerial Leader (12) is facing.
  3. Like in Stephen Covey’s “Maturity Continuum” (8) M/L capability evolves over time (see the diagram below) and makes possible a transformational outcome, if supported in one’s organisation by sufficient and timely post-conventional thinking.
  4. Such an outcome (9,10,11,14,17,19,20,21,23) occurred in Toyota from 1950, making it possible for the organisation to evolve into what Peter Senge (18) calls a “Learning Organisation” – one in which improvement science (4) ensues continually from the bottom-up, within a structure that has evolved top-down.
  5. In Toyota’s case it was W. Edwards Deming who is most credited with having been the catalyst. Jim Collins (6) evidences eleven other examples of an organisational transformation sparked by an individual with a post-conventional world view that transcended a pre-existing conventional one.
  6. Deming talked a lot about ways of thinking – paradigms – that, like Euclidian geometry, make sense in their own world, but not outside it. When speaking with anyone in a client organisation he always aimed at being empathic to a person’s individual frame of reference. He was interested in how individuals make their own common sense because he had learned that it is this that often negatively impacts an individual’s decision-making process and hence their impact on an organisational system that needs to continually learn – a phenomenon he called “tampering”.
  7. The diagram seeks to capture the ways in which paradigms (world views) collectively and sequentially evolve. It combines the research of several practitioners (2,7,15,16) who sought to empirically trace the archetypal evolution of individual sense-making.

JS_Blog_20160307_Fig1

In 2013, Don Berwick (5) recommended to the UK government that, in order to prioritise quality and safety, the National Health Service must become a Deming-style learning organisation. The NHS however is not one single organisation, it is a thousand organisations – both privately and publically owned.  Yet if structured with “Liberating Disciplines” (22) via appropriately set central standards (e.g. tools that prompt thinking that is scientifically methodical), each can be invited as a single organisation to transform themselves into a body with learning its core value. Berwick seems to appreciate that out of the apparently sufficient conventional thinking, enough post-conventional managerial leadership will then have a chance to take root, and in time bloom.

The purpose of this blog is to introduce a second essay:

“Managerial Leadership: Five action-logics viewed via two developmental lenses.”

In the first essay I used P-D-S-A as the integrative link between Managing and Leading – offering a total of just three learning contexts, but this always felt a little over-simplistic and in 2005 when coaching my daughter Josie – then in her sandwich year as an undergraduate trainee in the hospitality industry – I was persuaded by her to further sub-divide the two M/L modes – replacing two with four:

  1. maintaining
  2. continually improving
  3. innovating
  4. transforming.

Applying this new 4 action-logic model, Josie succeeded in transforming the fortunes of her hotel – winning a national award for her efforts – and this made me wonder if she might be on to something important?

I decided to use the new version of the model to explore what it would look like through first a “conventional” lens, and then second a “post-conventional” lens – illustrating the kinds of paradigm shifts that one might see in action when inside a learning organisation, in particular the way that accountabilities for performance are handled.

It is hard to describe a post-conventional way of seeing things to someone who developmentally has discovered only the conventional way – about 85% of adults. It is as if the instructions about how to get out of the box are on the outside. It is hoped that this essay may help some individuals unlock this conundrum. In a learning organisation for example it turns out that real-time data and feedback are essential for continually prompting individuals and organisations to rapidly evolve a new way of seeing.

BaseLine® for example is a tool that has been designed with this in mind. It allows conventional organisations and individuals, even those considering themselves relatively innumerate, to develop post-conventional habits; simply by using the time-series data that in many cases is already being collected – albeit usually for reasons of top-down accountability rather than methodical improvement. In this way, healthy developmental conversation gets sparked – and at all organisational levels: bottom, middle and top.

It also turns out that Continuous Improvement when seen though the second lens is not the same as Continual Improvement (mode 2) – and this is another one of the paradigm shifts that in the essay gets explained. Here is the model as it then appears:

JS_Blog_20160307_Fig2

Note that a fifth action-logic mode, modelling, is also now included. This emerged out of conversations I was having with Simon Dodds when writing the final draft in 2011. The essence of this mode is embodied in a phrase coined by the late Russell Ackoff – “idealized design” (1) – using modern computing technology to facilitate transformative change within tolerable levels of risk.

People often readily admit to spending much of their life in mode 1 (maintaining), whilst really preferring to be in mode 3 (innovating) – even admitting to seeing mode 1 as relatively boring, or at best as overly bureaucratic. Such individuals are especially prone to tampering, and may even shun regimes in which they feel overly controlled. What the post-conventional worldview offers however is not the prospect of being controlled, but the prospect of being in control – whilst simultaneously letting go – a paradox that is not easy to get unless developmentally ready – hence the 2005 essay. This goes for the tools too – especially when being deployed with the full cultural support that can flow from an organisation imbued with sufficient post-conventional design.

If the organisation can be designed to sufficiently support the right people to take control of each critical process or sub-system, who at the right level (usually the lowest point in the hierarchy that accountability may be accepted), may feel safely equipped to make sound decisions, genuine empowerment then becomes possible. Essentially, people then feel safe enough to self-empower and take charge of their system.

Toyota are an exemplar “learning organisation” – actually a system of organisations that work so harmoniously as a whole that by continually adapting to its changing environment, risk can be smoothly managed. Their preoccupation from bottom to top is understanding in real time what is changing so that changes (to the system) can then be proactively and wisely made. Each employee at each organisational level is educated to both manage and lead.

This approach has enabled them to grow to become the largest volume car maker in the world – and largely via organic growth alone. They have achieved this simply by constantly delivering what the customer wants with low variation (hence high reliability) and by continually studying that variation to uncover the real causes of problems. Performance is continually assessed over time and seen largely as pertaining to the system rather than being down to any one individual. Job hoppers – who though charismatic may also be practiced at being able to avoid having to live with the longer-term consequences of their actions – are not appointed to key roles.

Some will read the essay and say to themselves that little of this applies to me or my organisation – “we’re not Toyota, we’re not a private company, and we’re not even in manufacturing”. That however is likely to be a conventional view. The post-conventional principles described in the essay apply as much to service industries as to the public sector – both commissioners and providers – some of whom would intentionally evolve a post-conventional culture if given the space to do so.

At the very least I hope to have succeeded in convincing you, even if you don’t buy in to the notion of a Berwick-style learning system, that schooling people in management or leadership separately, or without a workable definition of each, is likely to be both cruel to the individual and to court dysfunction in the organisation.

References

  1. Ackoff R. Why so few organisations adopt systems thinking – 2007
  2. Beck D.E & Cowan C.C. – Spiral Dynamics – Mastering Values, Leadership, and Change – 1996
  3. Berwick D. – The Science of Improvement – 2008 : http://www.allhealth.org/BriefingMaterials/JAMA-Berwick-1151.pdf
  4. Berwick D. – The Science of Improvement – 2008 : http://www.allhealth.org/BriefingMaterials/JAMA-Berwick-1151.pdf
  5. Berwick Donald M. – Berwick Review into patient safety – 2013
  6. Collins J.C. – Level 5 Leadership: The triumph of Humility and Fierce Resolve – HBR Jan 2001
  7. Cook-Greuter. S. – Maps for living: ego-Development Stages Symbiosis to Conscious Universal Embeddedness – 1990
  8. Covey. S.R. – The 7 habits of Highly Effective People – 1989   (ISBN 0613191455)
  9. Delavigne K.T & Robertson J. D. – Deming’s profound changes – 1994
  10. Deming W. Edwards – Out of the Crisis – 1986 (ISBN 0-911379-01-0)
  11. Deming W.Edwards – The New Economics – 1993 (ISBN 0-911379-07-X) First edition
  12. Jaques. E. – Requisite Organisation: A Total System for Effective Managerial Organisation and Managerial Leadership for the 21st Century 1998 (ISBN 1886436045)
  13. Kotter. J. P. – A Force for Change: How Leadership Differs from Management – 1990
  14. Liker J.K & Meier D. – The Toyota Way Fieldbook – 2006
  15. Rooke D and Torbert W.R. – Organisational Transformation as a function of CEO’s Development Stage 1998 (Organisation Development Journal, Vol. 6.1)
  16. Rooke D and Torbert W.R. – Seven Transformations of Leadership – Harvard Business Review April 2005
  17. Scholtes Peter R. The Leader’s Handbook: Making Things Happen, Getting Things Done – 1998
  18. Senge. P. M. – The Fifth Discipline 1990 ISBN 10 – 0385260946
  19. Spear. S and Bowen H. K- Decoding the DNA of the Toyota Production System – Harvard Business Review Sept/Oct 1999
  20. Spear. S. – Learning to Lead at Toyota – Harvard Business Review – May 2004
  21. Takeuchi H, Osono E, Shimizu N. The contradictions that drive Toyota’s success. Harvard Business Review: June 2008
  22. Torbert W.R. & Associates – Action Inquiry – The secret of timely and transforming leadership – 2004
  23. Wheeler Donald J. – Advanced Topics in Statistical Process Control – the power of Shewhart Charts – 1995

 

british_pound_money_three_bundled_stack_400_wht_2425This week I conducted an experiment – on myself.

I set myself the challenge of measuring the cost of chaos, and it was tougher than I anticipated it would be.

It is easy enough to grasp the concept that fire-fighting to maintain patient safety amidst the chaos of healthcare would cost more in terms of tears and time …

… but it is tricky to translate that concept into hard numbers; i.e. cash.


Chaos is an emergent property of a system.  Safety, delivery, quality and cost are also emergent properties of a system. We can measure cost, our finance departments are very good at that. We can measure quality – we just ask “How did your experience match your expectation”.  We can measure delivery – we have created a whole industry of access target monitoring.  And we can measure safety by checking for things we do not want – near misses and never events.

But while we can feel the chaos we do not have an easy way to measure it. And it is hard to improve something that we cannot measure.


So the experiment was to see if I could create some chaos, then if I could calm it, and then if I could measure the cost of the two designs – the chaotic one and the calm one.  The difference, I reasoned, would be the cost of the chaos.

And to do that I needed a typical chunk of a healthcare system: like an A&E department where the relationship between safety, flow, quality and productivity is rather important (and has been a hot topic for a long time).

But I could not experiment on a real A&E department … so I experimented on a simplified but realistic model of one. A simulation.

What I discovered came as a BIG surprise, or more accurately a sequence of big surprises!

  1. First I discovered that it is rather easy to create a design that generates chaos and danger.  All I needed to do was to assume I understood how the system worked and then use some averaged historical data to configure my model.  I could do this on paper or I could use a spreadsheet to do the sums for me.
  2. Then I discovered that I could calm the chaos by reactively adding lots of extra capacity in terms of time (i.e. more staff) and space (i.e. more cubicles).  The downside of this approach was that my costs sky-rocketed; but at least I had restored safety and calm and I had eliminated the fire-fighting.  Everyone was happy … except the people expected to foot the bill. The finance director, the commissioners, the government and the tax-payer.
  3. Then I got a really big surprise!  My safe-but-expensive design was horribly inefficient.  All my expensive resources were now running at rather low utilisation.  Was that the cost of the chaos I was seeing? But when I trimmed the capacity and costs the chaos and danger reappeared.  So was I stuck between a rock and a hard place?
  4. Then I got a really, really big surprise!!  I hypothesised that the root cause might be the fact that the parts of my system were designed to work independently, and I was curious to see what happened when they worked interdependently. In synergy. And when I changed my design to work that way the chaos and danger did not reappear and the efficiency improved. A lot.
  5. And the biggest surprise of all was how difficult this was to do in my head; and how easy it was to do when I used the theory, techniques and tools of Improvement-by-Design.

So if you are curious to learn more … I have written up the full account of the experiment with rationale, methods, results, conclusions and references and I have published it here.

by Julian Simcox

Actually, it doesn’t much matter because everyone needs to be able to choose between managing and leading – as distinct and yet mutually complementary action/ logics – and to argue that one is better than the other, or worse to try to school people about just one of them on its own, is inane. The UK’s National Health Service for example is currently keen on convincing medics that they should become “clinical leaders”, the term “clinical manager” being rarely heard, yet if anything the NHS suffers more from a shortage of management skill.

It is not only healthcare that is short on management. In the first half of my career I held the title “manager” in seven different roles, and in three different organisations, and had even completed an Exec MBA, but still didn’t properly get what it meant. The people I reported into also had little idea about what “managing well” actually meant, and even if they had possessed an inclination to coach me, would have merely added to my confusion.

If however you are fortunate enough to be working in an organisation that over time has been purposefully developed as a “Learning Culture” you will have acquired an appreciation of the vital distinction between managing and leading, and just what a massive difference this makes to your effectiveness, for it requires you, before you act, to understand (11) how your system is really flowing and performing. Only then will you be ready to choose whether to manage or to lead.

It is therefore not your role’s title that matters but whether the system you are running is stable, and whether it is capable of producing the outcomes needed by your customers. It also matters how risk is to be handled by you and your organisation when you are making changes. Outcomes will depend heavily upon you and your team’s accumulated levels of learning – as well, as it turns out, upon your personal world view/ developmental stage (more of which later).

Here is a diagram that illustrates that there are three basic learning contexts that a “managerial leader” (7) needs to be adept at operating within if they are to be able to nimbly choose between them.

JS_Blog_20160221_Fig1

Depending on one’s definitions of the processes of managing and leading, most people would agree that the first learning context pertains to the process of managing, and the third to the process of leading. The second context         (P-D-S-A) which helpfully for NHS employees is core to the NHS “Model of Improvement” turns out to be especially vital for effective managerial leadership for it binds the other two contexts together – as long as you know how?

Following the Mid-Staffs Hospital disaster, David Cameron asked Professor Don Berwick to recommend how to enhance public safety in the UK’s healthcare system. Unusually for a clinician he gets the importance of understanding your system and knowing moment-to-moment whether managing or leading is the right course of action. He recommends that to evolve a system to be as safe as it can be, all NHS employees should “Learn, master and apply the modern methods of quality control, quality improvement and quality planning” (1). He makes this recommendation because without the thinking that accompanies modern quality control methods, clinical managerial leadership is lame.

The Journal of Improvement Science has recently re-published my 10 year old essay called:

“Intervening into Personal and Organisational Systems by Powerfully Leading and Wisely Managing”

Originally written from the perspective of a practising executive coach, and as a retrospective on the work of W. Edwards Deming, the essay describes just what it is that a few extraordinary Managerial Leaders seem to possess that enables them to simultaneously Manage and Lead Transformation – first of themselves, and second of their organisation. The essay culminates in a comparison of “conventional” and “post-conventional” organisations. Toyota (9,12) in which Deming’s influence continues to be profound, is used as an example of the latter. Using the 3 generic intervention modes/ learning contexts, and the way that these corresponds to an executive’s evolving developmental stage I illustrate how this works and with it what a massive difference it makes. It is only in the later (post-conventional) stages for example that the processes of managing and leading are seen as two sides of the same coin. Dee Hock (6) called these heightened levels of awareness “chaordic” and Jim Collins (2) calls the level of power this brings “Level 5 Leadership”.

JS_Blog_20160221_Fig2

Berwick, borrowing from Deming (4,5) knows that to be structured-to-learn organisations need systems thinking (11) – and that organisations need Managerial Leaders who are sufficiently developed to know how to think and intervene systemically – in other words he recognises the need for personally developing the capability to lead and manage.

Deming in particular seemed to understand the importance of developing empathy for different worldviews – he knew that each contains coherence, just as in its own flat-earth world Euclidian geometry makes perfect sense. When consulting he spent much of his time listening and asking people questions that might develop paradigmatic understanding – theirs and his. Likewise in my own work, primed with knowledge about the developmental stage of key individual players, I am more able to give my interventions teeth.

Possessing a definition of managerial leadership that can work at all the stages is also vital:

Managing =  keeping things flowing, and stable – and hence predictable – so you can consistently and confidently deliver what you’re promising. Any improvement comes from noticing what causes instability and eliminating that cause, or from learning what causes it via experimentation.

Leading  =  changing things, or transforming them, which risks a temporary loss of stability/ predictability in order to shift performance to a new and better level – a level that can then be managed and sustained.

If you resonate with the first essay you need to know that after publishing it I continued to develop the managerial leadership model into one that would work equally well for Managerial Leaders in either developmental epoch – conventional and post-conventional – whilst simultaneously balancing the level of change needed with the level of risk that’s politically tolerable – and all framed by the paradigm-shifts that typically characterise these two epochs. This revised model is described in detail in the essay:

Managerial Leadership: Five action logics viewed via two developmental lenses

– also soon to be made available via the Journal of Improvement Science.

References

  1. Berwick Donald M. – Berwick Review into patient safety (2013)
  2. Collins J.C. – Level 5 Leadership: The triumph of Humility and Fierce Resolve – HBR Jan 2001
  3. Covey. S.R. – The 7 habits of Highly Effective People – 1989 (ISBN 0613191455)
  4. Deming W. Edwards – Out of the Crisis – 1986   (ISBN 0-911379-01-0)
  5. Deming W.E – The New Economics – 1993 (ISBN 0-911379-07-X) First edition
  6. Hock. D. – The birth of the Chaordic Age 2000 (ISBN: 1576750744)
  7. Jaques. E. – Requisite Organisation: A Total System for Effective Managerial Organisation and Managerial Leadership for the 21st Century 1998 (ISBN 1886436045)
  8. Kotter. J. P. – A Force for Change: How Leadership Differs from Management – 1990
  9. Liker J.K & Meier D. – The Toyota Way Fieldbook. 2006
  10. Scholtes Peter R. The Leader’s Handbook: Making Things Happen, Getting Things Done. 1998
  11. Senge. P. M. – The Fifth Discipline 1990   ISBN 10-0385260946
  12. Spear. S. – Learning to Lead at Toyota – Harvard Business Review – May 2004

FreshMeatOldBonesEvolution is an amazing process.

Using the same building blocks that have been around for a lot time, it cooks up innovative permutations and combinations that reveal new and ever more useful properties.

Very often a breakthrough in understanding comes from a simplification, not from making it more complicated.

Knowledge evolves in just the same way.

Sometimes a well understood simplification in one branch of science is used to solve an ‘impossible’ problem in another.

Cross-fertilisation of learning is a healthy part of the evolution process.


Improvement implies evolution of knowledge and understanding, and then application of that insight in the process of designing innovative ways of doing things better.


And so it is in healthcare.  For many years the emphasis on healthcare improvement has been the Safety-and-Quality dimension, and for very good reasons.  We need to avoid harm and we want to achieve happiness; for everyone.

But many of the issues that plague healthcare systems are not primarily SQ issues … they are flow and productivity issues. FP. The safety and quality problems are secondary – so only focussing on them is treating the symptoms and not the cause.  We need to balance the wheel … we need flow science.


Fortunately the science of flow is well understood … outside healthcare … but apparently not so well understood inside healthcare … given the queues, delays and chaos that seem to have become the expected norm.  So there is a big opportunity for cross fertilisation here.  If we choose to make it happen.


For example, from computer science we can borrow the knowledge of how to schedule tasks to make best use of our finite resources and at the same time avoid excessive waiting.

It is a very well understood science. There is comprehensive theory, a host of techniques, and fit-for-purpose tools that we can pick of the shelf and use. Today if we choose to.

So what are the reasons we do not?

Is it because healthcare is quite introspective?

Is it because we believe that there is something ‘special’ about healthcare?

Is it because there is no evidence … no hard proof … no controlled trials?

Is it because we assume that queues are always caused by lack of resources?

Is it because we do not like change?

Is it because we do not like to admit that we do not know stuff?

Is it because we fear loss of face?


Whatever the reasons the evidence and experience shows that most (if not all) the queues, delays and chaos in healthcare systems are iatrogenic.

This means that they are self-generated. And that implies we can un-self-generate them … at little or no cost … if only we knew how.

The only cost is to our egos of having to accept that there is knowledge out there that we could use to move us in the direction of excellence.

New meat for our old bones?

 

RIA_graphicA question that is often asked by doctors in particular is “What is the difference between Research, Audit and Improvement Science?“.

It is a very good question and the diagram captures the essence of the answer.

Improvement science is like a bridge between research and audit.

To understand why that is we first need to ask a different question “What are the purposes of research, improvement science and audit? What do they do?

In a nutshell:

Research provides us with new knowledge and tells us what the right stuff is.
Improvement Science provides us with a way to design our system to do the right stuff.
Audit provides us with feedback and tells us if we are doing the right stuff right.


Research requires a suggestion and an experiment to test it.   A suggestion might be “Drug X is better than drug Y at treating disease Z”, and the experiment might be a randomised controlled trial (RCT).  The way this is done is that subjects with disease Z are randomly allocated to two groups, the control group and the study group.  A measure of ‘better’ is devised and used in both groups. Then the study group is given drug X and the control group is given drug Y and the outcomes are compared.  The randomisation is needed because there are always many sources of variation that we cannot control, and it also almost guarantees that there will be some difference between our two groups. So then we have to use sophisticated statistical data analysis to answer the question “Is there a statistically significant difference between the two groups? Is drug X actually better than drug Y?”

And research is often a complicated and expensive process because to do it well requires careful study design, a lot of discipline, and usually large study and control groups. It is an effective way to help us to know what the right stuff is but only in a generic sense.


Audit requires a standard to compare with and to know if what we are doing is acceptable, or not. There is no randomisation between groups but we still need a metric and we still need to measure what is happening in our local reality.  We then compare our local experience with the global standard and, because variation is inevitable, we have to use statistical tools to help us perform that comparison.

And very often audit focuses on avoiding failure; in other words the standard is a ‘minimum acceptable standard‘ and as long as we are not failing it then that is regarded as OK. If we are shown to be failing then we are in trouble!

And very often the most sophisticated statistical tool used for audit is called an average.  We measure our performance, we average it over a period of time (to remove the troublesome variation), and we compare our measured average with the minimum standard. And if it is below then we are in trouble and if it is above then we are not.  We have no idea how reliable that conclusion is though because we discounted any variation.


A perfect example of this target-driven audit approach is the A&E 95% 4-hour performance target.

The 4-hours defines the metric we are using; the time interval between a patient arriving in A&E and them leaving. It is called a lead time metric. And it is easy to measure.

The 95% defined the minimum  acceptable average number of people who are in A&E for less than 4-hours and it is usually aggregated over three months. And it is easy to measure.

So, if about 200 people arrive in a hospital A&E each day and we aggregate for 90 days that is about 18,000 people in total so the 95% 4-hour A&E target implies that we accept as OK for about 900 of them to be there for more than 4-hours.

Do the 900 agree? Do the other 17,100?  Has anyone actually asked the patients what they would like?


The problem with this “avoiding failure” mindset is that it can never lead to excellence. It can only deliver just above the minimum acceptable. That is called mediocrity.  It is perfectly possible for a hospital to deliver 100% on its A&E 4 hour target by designing its process to ensure every one of the 18,000 patients is there for exactly 3 hours and 59 minutes. It is called a time-trap design.

We can hit the target and miss the point.

And what is more the “4-hours” and the “95%” are completely arbitrary numbers … there is not a shred of research evidence to support them.

So just this one example illustrates the many problems created by having a gap between research and audit.


And that is why we need Improvement Science to help us to link them together.

We need improvement science to translate the global knowledge and apply it to deliver local improvement in whatever metrics we feel are most important. Safety metrics, flow metrics, quality metrics and productivity metrics. Simultaneously. To achieve system-wide excellence. For everyone, everywhere.

When we learn Improvement Science we learn to measure how well we are doing … we learn the power of measurement of success … and we learn to avoid averaging because we want to see the variation. And we still need a minimum acceptable standard because we want to exceed it 100% of the time. And we want continuous feedback on just how far above the minimum acceptable standard we are. We want to see how excellent we are, and we want to share that evidence and our confidence with our patients.

We want to agree a realistic expectation rather than paint a picture of the worst case scenario.

And when we learn Improvement Science we will see very clearly where to focus our improvement efforts.


Improvement Science is the bit in the middle.


Stop Press:  There is currently an offer of free on-line foundation training in improvement science for up to 1000 doctors-in-training … here  … and do not dally because places are being snapped up fast!

Nerve_CurveThe emotional journey of change feels like a roller-coaster ride and if we draw as an emotion versus time chart it looks like the diagram above.

The toughest part is getting past the low point called the Well of Despair and doing that requires a combination of inner strength and external support.

The external support comes from an experienced practitioner who has been through it … and survived … and has the benefit of experience and hindsight.

The Improvement Science coach.


What happens as we  apply the IS principles, techniques and tools that we have diligently practiced and rehearsed? We discover that … they work!  And all the fence-sitters and the skeptics see it too.

We start to turn the corner and what we feel next is that the back pressure of resistance falls a bit. It does not go away, it just gets less.

And that means that the next test of change is a bit easier and we start to add more evidence that the science of improvement does indeed work and moreover it is a skill we can learn, demonstrate and teach.

We have now turned the corner of disbelief and have started the long, slow, tough climb through mediocrity to excellence.


This is also a time of risks and there are several to be aware of:

  1. The objective evidence that dramatic improvements in safety, flow, quality and productivity are indeed possible and that the skills can be learned will trigger those most threatened by the change to fight harder to defend their disproved rhetoric. And do not underestimate how angry and nasty they can get!
  2. We can too easily become complacent and believe that the rest will follow easily. It doesn’t.  We may have nailed some of the easier niggles to be sure … but there are much more challenging ones ahead.  The climb to excellence is a steep learning curve … all the way. But the rewards get bigger and bigger as we progress so it is worth it.
  3. We risk over-estimating our capability and then attempting to take on the tougher improvement assignments without the necessary training, practice, rehearsal and support. If we do that we will crash and burn.  It is like a game of snakes and ladders.  Our IS coach is there to help us up the ladders and to point out where the slippery snakes are lurking.

So before embarking on this journey be sure to find a competent IS coach.

They are easy to identify because they will have a portfolio of case studies that they have done themselves. They have the evidence of successful outcomes and that they can walk-the-talk.

And avoid anyone who talks-the-walk but does not have a portfolio of evidence of their own competence. Their Siren song will lure you towards the submerged Rocks of Disappointment and they will disappear like morning mist when you need them most – when it comes to the toughest part – turning the corner. You will be abandoned and fall into the Well of Despair.

So ask your IS coach for credentials, case studies and testimonials and check them out.

Dr_Bob_ThumbnailDr Bob runs a Clinic for Sick Systems and is sharing the Case of St Elsewhere’s® Hospital which is suffering from chronic pain in their A&E department.

The story so far: The history and examination of St.Elsewhere’s® Emergency Flow System have revealed that the underlying disease includes carveoutosis multiforme.  StE has consented to a knowledge transplant but is suffering symptoms of disbelief – the emotional rejection of the new reality. Dr Bob prescribed some loosening up exercises using the Carveoutosis Game.  This is the appointment to review the progress.


<Dr Bob> Hello again. I hope you have done the exercises as we agreed.

<StE> Indeed we have.  Many times in fact because at first we could not believe what we were seeing. We even modified the game to explore the ramifications.  And we have an apology to make. We discounted what you said last week but you were absolutely correct.

<Dr Bob> I am delighted to hear that you have explored further and I applaud you for the curiosity and courage in doing that.  There is no need to apologize. If this flow science was intuitively obvious then we we would not be having this conversation. So, how have you used the new understanding?

<StE> Before we tell the story of what happened next we are curious to know where you learned about this?

<Dr Bob> The pathogenesis of carveoutosis spatialis has been known for about 100 years but in a different context.  The story goes back to the 1870s when Alexander Graham Bell invented the telephone.  He was not an engineer or mathematician by background; he was interested in phonetics and he was a pragmatist and experimented by making things. He invented the telephone and the Bell Telephone Co. was born.  This innovation spread like wildfire, as you can imagine, and by the early 1900’s there were many telephone companies all over the world.  At that time the connections were made manually by telephone operators using patch boards and the growing demand created a new problem.  How many lines and operators were needed to provide a high quality service to bill paying customers? In other words … to achieve an acceptably low chance of hearing the reply “I’m sorry but all lines are busy, please try again later“.  Adding new lines and more operators was a slow and expensive business so they needed a way to predict how many would be needed – and how to do that was not obvious!  In 1917 a Danish mathematician, statistician and engineer called Agner Karup Erlang published a paper with the solution.  A complicated formula that described the relationship and this equation allowed telephone exchanges to be designed, built and staffed and to provide a high quality service at an acceptably low cost.  Mass real-time voice communication by telephone became affordable and has transformed the world.

<StE> Fascinating! We sort of sense there is a link here and certainly the “high quality and low cost” message resonates for us. But how does designing telephone exchanges relate to hospital beds?

<Dr Bob> If we equate an emergency admission needing a bed to a customer making a phone call, and we equate the number of telephone lines to the number of beds, then the two systems are the same from the flow physics perspective. Erlang’s scary-looking equation can be used to estimate the number of beds needed to achieve any specified level of admission service quality if you know the average rate of demand and average the length of stay.  That is how I made the estimate last week. It is this predictable-within-limits behaviour that you demonstrated to yourself with the Carveoutosis Game.

<StE> And this has been known for nearly 100 years but we have only just learned about it!

<Dr Bob> Yes. That is a bit annoying isn’t it?

<StE> And that explains why when we ‘ring-fence’ our fixed stock of beds the 4-hour performance falls!

<Dr Bob> Yes, that is a valid assertion. By doing that you are reducing your space-capacity resilience and the resulting danger, chaos, disappointment and escalating cost is completely predictable.

<StE> So our pain is iatrogenic as you said! We have unwittingly caused this. That is uncomfortable news to hear.

<Dr Bob> The root cause is actually not what you have done wrong, it is what you have not done right. Yours is an error of omission. You have not learned to listen to what your system is telling you. You have not learned how that can help you to deepen your understanding of how your system works. It is that wisdom that you need to design a safer, calmer, higher quality and more affordable healthcare system.

<StE> And now we can see our omission … before it was like a blind spot … and now we can see the fallacy of our previously deeply held belief: that it was impossible to solve this without more beds, more staff and more money.  The gap is now obvious where before it was invisible. It is like a light has been turned on.  Now we know what to do and we are on the road to recovery. We need to learn how to do this ourselves … but not by meddling … we need to learn to diagnose and then to design and then to deliver safety, flow, quality and productivity.  All at the same time.

<Dr Bob> Welcome to the exciting world of Improvement Science. And here I must sound a note of caution … there is a lot more to it than just blindly applying Erlang’s scary equation. That will get us into the right ball-park, which is a big leap forward, but real systems are not just simple, passive games of chance; they are complicated, active and adaptive.  Applying the principles of flow design in that context requires more than just mathematics, statistics and computer models.  But that know-how is available and accessible too … and waiting for when you are ready to take that leap of learning.

So I do not think you require any more help from me at this stage or follow up appointments. You have what you need and I wish you well.  And please let me know the outcome.

<StE> Thank you and rest assured we will. We have already started writing our story … and we wanted to share the that with you today … but with this new insight we will need to write a few more chapters first.  This is really exciting … thank you so much.


St.Elsewhere’s® is a registered trademark of Kate Silvester Ltd,  and to read more real cases of 4-hour A&E pain download Kate’s: The Christmas Crisis


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Monitor_Summary


This week an interesting report was published by Monitor – about some possible reasons for the A&E debacle that England experienced in the winter of 2014.

Summary At A Glance

“91% of trusts did not  meet the A&E 4-hour maximum waiting time standard last winter – this was the worst performance in 10 years”.


So it seems a bit odd that the very detailed econometric analysis and the testing of “Ten Hypotheses” did not look at the pattern of change over the previous 10 years … it just compared Oct-Dec 2014 with the same period for 2013! And the conclusion: “Hospitals were fuller in 2014“.  H’mm.


The data needed to look back 10 years is readily available on the various NHS England websites … so here it is plotted as simple time-series charts.  These are called system behaviour charts or SBCs. Our trusted analysis tools will be a Mark I Eyeball connected to the 1.3 kg of wetware between our ears that runs ChimpOS 1.0 …  and we will look back 11 years to 2004.

A&E_Arrivals_2004-15First we have the A&E Arrivals chart … about 3.4 million arrivals per quarter. The annual cycle is obvious … higher in the summer and falling in the winter. And when we compare the first five years with the last six years there has been a small increase of about 5% and that seems to associate with a change of political direction in 2010.

So over 11 years the average A&E demand has gone up … a bit … but only by about 5%.


A&E_Admissions_2004-15In stark contrast the A&E arrivals that are admitted to hospital has risen relentlessly over the same 11 year period by about 50% … that is about 5% per annum … ten times the increase in arrivals … and with no obvious step in 2010. We can see the annual cycle too.  It is a like a ratchet. Click click click.


But that does not make sense. Where are these extra admissions going to? We can only conclude that over 11 years we have progressively added more places to admit A&E patients into.  More space-capacity to store admitted patients … so we can stop the 4-hour clock perhaps? More emergency assessment units perhaps? Places to wait with the clock turned off perhaps? The charts imply that our threshold for emergency admission has been falling: Admission has become increasingly the ‘easier option’ for whatever reason.  So why is this happening? Do more patients need to be admitted?


In a recent empirical study we asked elderly patients about their experience of the emergency process … and we asked them just after they had been discharged … when it was still fresh in their memories. A worrying pattern emerged. Many said that they had been admitted despite them saying they did not want to be.  In other words they did not willingly consent to admission … they were coerced.

This is anecdotal data so, by implication, it is wholly worthless … yes?  Perhaps from a statistical perspective but not from an emotional one.  It is a red petticoat being waved that should not be ignored.  Blissful ignorance comes from ignoring anecdotal stuff like this. Emotionally uncomfortable anecdotal stories. Ignore the early warning signs and suffer the potentially catastrophic consequences.


A&E_Breaches_2004-15And here is the corresponding A&E 4-hour Target Failure chart.  Up to 2010 the imposed target was 98% success (i.e. 2% acceptable failure) and, after bit of “encouragement” in 2004-5, this was actually achieved in some of the summer months (when the A&E demand was highest remember).

But with a change of political direction in 2010 the “hated” 4-hour target was diluted down to 95% … so a 5% failure rate was now ‘acceptable’ politically, operationally … and clinically.

So it is no huge surprise that this is what was achieved … for a while at least.

In the period 2010-13 the primary care trusts (PCTs) were dissolved and replaced by clinical commissioning groups (CCGs) … the doctors were handed the ignition keys to the juggernaut that was already heading towards the cliff.

The charts suggest that the seeds were already well sown by 2010 for an evolving catastrophe that peaked last year; and the changes in 2010 and 2013 may have just pressed the accelerator pedal a bit harder. And if the trend continues it will be even worse this coming winter. Worse for patients and worse for staff and worse for commissioners and  worse for politicians. Lose lose lose lose.


So to summarise the data from the NHS England’s own website:

1. A&E arrivals have gone up 5% over 11 years.
2. Admissions from A&E have gone up 50% over 11 years.
3. Since lowering the threshold for acceptable A&E performance from 98% to 95% the system has become unstable and “fallen off the cliff” … but remember, a temporal association does not prove causation.

So what has triggered the developing catastrophe?

Well, it is important to appreciate that when a patient is admitted to hospital it represents an increase in workload for every part of the system that supports the flow through the hospital … not just the beds.  Beds represent space-capacity. They are just where patients are stored.  We are talking about flow-capacity; and that means people, consumables, equipment, data and cash.

So if we increase emergency admissions by 50% then, if nothing else changes, we will need to increase the flow-capacity by 50% and the space-capacity to store the work-in-progress by 50% too. This is called Little’s Law. It is a mathematically proven Law of Flow Physics. It is not negotiable.

So have we increased our flow-capacity and our space-capacity (and our costs) by 50%? I don’t know. That data is not so easy to trawl from the websites. It will be there though … somewhere.

What we have seen is an increase in bed occupancy (the red box on Monitor’s graphic above) … but not a 50% increase … that is impossible if the occupancy is already over 85%.  A hospital is like a rigid metal box … it cannot easily expand to accommodate a growing queue … so the inevitable result in an increase in the ‘pressure’ inside.  We have created an emergency care pressure cooker. Well lots of them actually.

And that is exactly what the staff who work inside hospitals says it feels like.

And eventually the relentless pressure and daily hammering causes the system to start to weaken and fail, gradually at first then catastrophically … which is exactly what the NHS England data charts are showing.


So what is the solution?  More beds?

Nope.  More beds will create more space and that will relieve the pressure … for a while … but it will not address the root cause of why we are admitting 50% more patients than we used to; and why we seem to need to increase the pressure inside our hospitals to squeeze the patients through the process and extrude them out of the various exit nozzles.

Those are the questions we need to have understandable and actionable answers to.

Q1: Why are we admitting 5% more of the same A&E arrivals each year rather than delivering what they need in 4 hours or less and returning them home? That is what the patients are asking for.

Q2: Why do we have to push patients through the in-hospital process rather than pulling them through? The staff are willing to work but not inside a pressure cooker.


A more sensible improvement strategy is to look at the flow processes within the hospital and ensure that all the steps and stages are pulling together to the agreed goals and plan for each patient. The clinical management plan that was decided when the patient was first seen in A&E. The intended outcome for each patient and the shortest and quickest path to achieving it.


Our target is not just a departure within 4 hours of arriving in A&E … it is a competent diagnosis (study) and an actionable clinical management plan (plan) within 4 hours of arriving; and then a process that is designed to deliver (do) it … for every patient. Right, first time, on time, in full and at a cost we can afford.

Q: Do we have that?
A: Nope.

Q: Is that within our gift to deliver?
A: Yup.

Q: So what is the reason we are not already doing it?
A: Good question.  Who in the NHS is trained how to do system-wide flow design like this?

smack_head_in_disappointment_150_wht_16653One of the traps for the inexperienced Improvement Science Practitioner is to believe that applying the science in the real world is as easy as it is in the safety of the training environment.

It isn’t.

The real world is messier and more complicated and it is easy to get lost in the fog of confusion and chaos.


So how do we avoid losing our footing, slipping into the toxic emotional swamp of organisational culture and giving ourselves an unpleasant dunking!

We use safety equipment … to protect ourselves and others from unintended harm.

The Improvement-by-Design framework is like a scaffold.  It is there to provide structure and safety.  The techniques and tools are like the harnesses, shackles, ropes, crampons, and pitons.  They give us flexibility and security.

But we need to know how to use them. We need to be competent as well as confident.

We do not want to tie ourselves up in knots … and we do not want to discover that we have not tied ourselves to something strong enough to support us if we slip. Which we will.


So we need to learn an practice the basics skills to the point that they are second nature.

We need to learn how to tie secure knots, quickly and reliably.

We need to learn how to plan an ascent … identifying the potential hazards and designing around them.

We need to learn how to assemble and check what we will need before we start … not too much and not too little.

We need to learn how to monitor out progress against our planned milestones and be ready to change the plan as we go …and even to abandon the attempt if necessary.


We would not try to climb a real mountain without the necessary training, planning, equipment and support … even though it might look easy.

And we do not try to climb an improvement mountain without the necessary training, planning, tools and support … even though it might look easy.

It is not as easy as it looks.

Dr_Bob_ThumbnailThere is a big bun-fight kicking off on the topic of 7-day working in the NHS.

The evidence is that there is a statistical association between mortality in hospital of emergency admissions and day of the week: and weekends are more dangerous.

There are fewer staff working at weekends in hospitals than during the week … and delays and avoidable errors increase … so risk of harm increases.

The evidence also shows that significantly fewer patients are discharged at weekends.


So the ‘obvious’ solution is to have more staff on duty at weekends … which will cost more money.


Simple, obvious, linear and wrong.  Our intuition has tricked us … again!


Let us unravel this Gordian Knot with a bit of flow science and a thought experiment.

1. The evidence shows that there are fewer discharges at weekends … and so demonstrates lack of discharge flow-capacity. A discharge process is not a single step, there are many things that must flow in sync for a discharge to happen … and if any one of them is missing or delayed then the discharge does not happen or is delayed.  The weakest link effect.

2. The evidence shows that the number of unplanned admissions varies rather less across the week; which makes sense because they are unplanned.

3. So add those two together and at weekends we see hospitals filling up with unplanned admissions – not because the sick ones are arriving faster – but because the well ones are leaving slower.

4. The effect of this is that at weekends the queue of people in beds gets bigger … and they need looking after … which requires people and time and money.

5. So the number of staffed beds in a hospital must be enough to hold the biggest queue – not the average or some fudged version of the average like a 95th percentile.

6. So a hospital running a 5-day model needs more beds because there will be more variation in bed use and we do not want to run out of beds and delay the admission of the newest and sickest patients. The ones at most risk.

7. People do not get sicker because there is better availability of healthcare services – but saying we need to add more unplanned care flow capacity at weekends implies that it does.  What is actually required is that the same amount of flow-resource that is currently available Mon-Fri is spread out Mon-Sun. The flow-capacity is designed to match the customer demand – not the convenience of the supplier.  And that means for all parts of the system required for unplanned patients to flow.  What, where and when. It costs the same.

8. Then what happens is that the variation in the maximum size of the queue of patients in the hospital will fall and empty beds will appear – as if by magic.  Empty beds that ensure there is always one for a new, sick, unplanned admission on any day of the week.

9. And empty beds that are never used … do not need to be staffed … so there is a quick way to reduce expensive agency staff costs.

So with a comprehensive 7-day flow-capacity model the system actually gets safer, less chaotic, higher quality and less expensive. All at the same time. Safety-Flow-Quality-Productivity.

It was the time for Bob and Leslie’s regular coaching session. Dr_Bob_ThumbnailBob was already on line when Leslie dialed in to the teleconference.

<Leslie> Hi Bob, sorry I am a bit late.

<Bob> No problem Leslie. What aspect of improvement science shall we explore today?

<Leslie> Well, I’ve been working through the Safety-Flow-Quality-Productivity cycle in my project and everything is going really well.  The team are really starting to put the bits of the jigsaw together and can see how the synergy works.

<Bob> Excellent. And I assume they can see the sources of antagonism too.

<Leslie> Yes, indeed! I am now up to the point of considering productivity and I know it was introduced at the end of the Foundation course but only very briefly.

<Bob> Yes,  productivity was described as a system metric. A ratio of a steam metric and a stage metric … what we get out of the streams divided by what we put into the stages.  That is a very generic definition.

<Leslie> Yes, and that I think is my problem. It is too generic and I get it confused with concepts like efficiency.  Are they the same thing?

<Bob> A very good question and the short answer is “No”, but we need to explore that in more depth.  Many people confuse efficiency and productivity and I believe that is because we learn the meaning of words from the context that we see them used in. If  others use the words imprecisely then it generates discussion, antagonism and confusion and we are left with the impression of that it is a ‘difficult’ subject.  The reality is that it is not difficult when we use the words in a valid way.

<Leslie> OK. That reassures me a bit … so what is the definition of efficiency?

<Bob> Efficiency is a stream metric – it is the ratio of the minimum cost of the resources required to complete one task divided by the actual cost of the resources used to complete one task.

<Leslie> Um.  OK … so how does time come into that?

<Bob> Cost is a generic concept … it can refer to time, money and lots of other things.  If we stick to time and money then we know that if we have to employ ‘people’ then time will cost money because people need money to buy essential stuff that the need for survival. Water, food, clothes, shelter and so on.

<Leslie> So we could use efficiency in terms of resource-time required to complete a task?

<Bob> Yes. That is a very useful way of looking at it.

<Leslie> So how is productivity different? Completed tasks out divided by cash in to pay for resource time would be a productivity metric. It looks the same.

<Bob> Does it?  The definition of efficiency is possible cost divided by actual cost. It is not the as our definition of system productivity.

<Leslie> Ah yes, I see. So do others define productivity the same way?

<Bob> Try looking it up on Wikipedia …

<Leslie> OK … here we go …

Productivity is an average measure of the efficiency of production. It can be expressed as the ratio of output to inputs used in the production process, i.e. output per unit of input”.

Now that is really confusing!  It looks like efficiency and productivity are the same. Let me see what the Wikipedia definition of efficiency is …

“Efficiency is the (often measurable) ability to avoid wasting materials, energy, efforts, money, and time in doing something or in producing a desired result”.

But that is closer to your definition of efficiency – the actual cost is the minimum cost plus the cost of waste.

<Bob> Yes.  I think you are starting to see where the confusion arises.  And this is because there is a critical piece of the jigsaw missing.

<Leslie> Oh …. and what is that?

<Bob> Worth.

<Leslie> Eh?

<Bob> Efficiency has nothing to do with whether the output of the stream has any worth.  I can produce a worthless product with low waste … in other words very efficiently.  And what if we have the situation where the output of my process is actually harmful.  The more efficiently I use my resources the more harm I will cause from a fixed amount of resource … and in that situation it is actually safer to have an inefficient process!

<Leslie> Wow!  That really hits the nail on the head … and the implications are … profound.  Efficiency is objective and relates only to flow … and between flow and productivity we have to cross the Safety-Quality line. Productivity also includes the subjective concept of worth or value. That all makes complete sense now. A productive system is a subjectively and objectively win-win-win design.

<Bob> Yup.  Get the safety, flow and quality perspectives of the design in synergy and productivity will sky-rocket. It is called a Fit-4-Purpose design.

smack_head_in_disappointment_150_wht_16653Many organisations proclaim that their mission is to achieve excellence but then proceed to deliver mediocre performance.

Why is this?

It is certainly not from lack of purpose, passion or people.

So the flaw must lie somewhere in the process.


The clue lies in how we measure performance … and to see the collective mindset behind the design of the performance measurement system we just need to examine the key performance indicators or KPIs.

Do they measure failure or success?


Let us look at some from the NHS …. hospital mortality, hospital acquired infections, never events, 4-hour A&E breaches, cancer wait breaches, 18 week breaches, and so on.

In every case the metric reported is a failure metric. Not a success metric.

And the focus of action is getting away from failure.

Damage mitigation, damage limitation and damage compensation.


So we have the answer to our question: we know we are doing a good job when we are not failing.

But are we?

When we are not failing we are not doing a bad job … is that the same as doing a good job?

Q: Does excellence  = not excrement?

A: No. There is something between these extremes.

The succeed-or-fail dichotomy is a distorting simplification created by applying an arbitrary threshold to a continuous measure of performance.


And how, specifically, have we designed our current system to avoid failure?

Usually by imposing an arbitrary target connected to a punitive reaction to failure. Management by fear.

This generates punishment-avoidance and back-covering behaviour which is manifest as a lot of repeated checking and correcting of the inevitable errors that we find.  A lot of extra work that requires extra time and that requires extra money.

So while an arbitrary-target-driven-check-and-correct design may avoid failing on safety, the additional cost may cause us to then fail on financial viability.

Out of the frying pan and into the fire.

No wonder Governance and Finance come into conflict!

And if we do manage to pull off a uneasy compromise … then what level of quality are we achieving?


Studies show that if take a random sample of 100 people from the pool of ‘disappointed by their experience’ and we ask if they are prepared to complain then only 5% will do so.

So if we use complaints as our improvement feedback loop and we react to that and make changes that eliminate these complaints then what do we get? Excellence?

Nope.

We get what we designed … just good enough to avoid the 5% of complaints but not the 95% of disappointment.

We get mediocrity.


And what do we do then?

We start measuring ‘customer satisfaction’ … which is actually asking the question ‘did your experience meet your expectation?’

And if we find that satisfaction scores are disappointingly low then how do we improve them?

We have two choices: improve the experience or reduce the expectation.

But as we are very busy doing the necessary checking-and-correcting then our path of least resistance to greater satisfaction is … to lower expectations.

And we do that by donning the black hat of the pessimist and we lay out the the risks and dangers.

And by doing that we generate anxiety and fear.  Which was not the intended outcome.


Our mission statement proclaims ‘trusted to achieve excellence’ not ‘designed to deliver mediocrity’.

But mediocrity is what the evidence says we are delivering. Just good enough to avoid a smack from the Regulators.

And if we are honest with ourselves then we are forced to conclude that:

A design that uses failure metrics as the primary feedback loop can achieve no better than mediocrity.


So if we choose  to achieve excellence then we need a better feedback design.

We need a design that uses success metrics as the primary feedback loop and we use failure metrics only in safety critical contexts.

And the ideal people to specify the success metrics are those who feel the benefit directly and immediately … the patients who receive care and the staff who give it.

Ask a patient what they want and they do not say “To be treated in less than 18 weeks”.  In fact I have yet to meet a patient who has even heard of the 18-week target!

A patient will say ‘I want to know what is wrong, what can be done, when it can be done, who will do it, what do I need to do, and what can I expect to be the outcome’.

Do we measure any of that?

Do we measure accuracy of diagnosis? Do we measure use of best evidenced practice? Do we know the possible delivery time (not the actual)? Do we inform patients of what they can expect to happen? Do we know what they can expect to happen? Do we measure outcome for every patient? Do we feed that back continuously and learn from it?

Nope.


So …. if we choose and commit to delivering excellence then we will need to start measuring-4-success and feeding what we see back to those who deliver the care.

Warts and all.

So that we know when we are doing a good job, and we know where to focus further improvement effort.

And if we abdicate that commitment and choose to deliver mediocrity-by-default then we are the engineers of our own chaos and despair.

We have the choice.

We just need to make it.

IS_PyramidDeveloping productive improvement capability in an organisation is like building a pyramid in the desert.

It is not easy and it takes time before there is any visible evidence of success.

The height of the pyramid is a measure of the level of improvement complexity that we can take on.

An improvement of a single step in a system would only require a small pyramid.

Improving the whole system will require a much taller one.


But if we rush and attempt to build a sky-scraper on top of the sand then we will not be surprised when it topples over before we have made very much progress.  The Egyptians knew this!

First, we need to dig down and to lay some foundations.  Stable enough and strong enough to support the whole structure.  We will never see the foundations so it is easy to forget them in our rush but they need to be there and they need to be there first.

It is the same when developing improvement science capability  … the foundations are laid first and when enough of that foundation knowledge is in place we can start to build the next layer of the pyramid: the practitioner layer.


It is the the Improvement Science Practitioners (ISPs) who start to generate tangible evidence of progress.  The first success stories help to spur us all on to continue to invest effort, time and money in widening our foundations to be able to build even higher – more layers of capability -until we can realistically take on a system wide improvement challenge.

So sharing the first hard evidence of improvement is an important milestone … it is proof of fitness for purpose … and that news should be shared with those toiling in the hot desert sun and with those watching from the safety of the shade.

So here is a real story of a real improvement pyramid achieving this magical and motivating milestone.